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ABSTRACT 
Broadcast Encryption is the task of cryptographically securing communication in 
a broadcast environment so that only a dynamically specified subset of 
subscribers, called the privileged subset, may decrypt the communication. In 
practical applications, it is desirable for a Broadcast Encryption Scheme (   ) to 
demonstrate resilience against attacks by colluding, unprivileged subscribers. 
Minimal Perfect Hash Families (    ) have been shown to provide a basis for 
the construction of memory-efficient  -resilient Key Pre-distribution Schemes 
(    ) from multiple instances of 1-resilient     . Using this technique, the task 
of constructing a large  -resilient     is reduced to finding a near-minimal     of 
appropriate parameters. While combinatorial and probabilistic constructions exist 
for minimal      with certain parameters, the complexity of constructing them in 
general is currently unknown. 
This thesis introduces a new type of hash family, called a Scattering Hash 
Family (    ), which is designed to allow for the scalable and ingredient-
independent design of memory-efficient      for large parameters, specifically 
resilience and total number of subscribers. A general     construction using 
      is shown, which constructs  -resilient      from other      of any 
resilience      .  
In addition to demonstrating how       can be used to produce     , this 
thesis explores several      construction techniques. The initial technique 
demonstrates a probabilistic, non-constructive proof of existence for      .  This 
construction is then derandomized into a direct, polynomial time construction of 
near-minimal       using the method of conditional expectations. As an 
alternative approach to direct construction, representing       as a  -restriction 
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problem allows for the indirect construction of       via randomized post-
optimization.  
Using the methods defined,       are constructed and the parameters’ 
effects on solution size are analyzed. For large strengths, constructive 
techniques lose significant performance, and as such, asymptotic analysis is 
performed using the non-constructive existential results. This work concludes 
with an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of      based on the 
constructed      . Due to the novel nature of      , the results of this analysis 
are used as the foundation for an empirical comparison between     -based 
and    -based     . The primary bases of comparison are construction 
efficiency, key material requirements, and message transmission overhead.  
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A broadcast environment is an overarching title given to any scenario in which a 
central authority is attempting to communicate over a channel that cannot be 
guaranteed to be private. Such an environment can be physical, as with the 
distribution of DVDs or other physical media, or it can be virtual, as with radio 
and network-based broadcasts. In many of these scenarios, it is desirable to limit 
the ability of parties to receive a given message to a select subset of listeners 
while still taking advantage of the convenience of transmitting over a broadcast 
medium. Traditional symmetric encryption models do not fit this model of 
communication because they tend to operate by securing individual channels of 
communication between parties. This approach would result in an infeasible 
amount of overhead for the central authority to send a message to potentially 
tens of thousands of listeners. In pursuit of this goal, and in light of these 
restrictions, the study of broadcast encryption was formed. 
When broadcasting a message that is to be encrypted to some set of 
listeners, there are two important factors to consider. The first is how to distribute 
the key material to the listeners and the second is how the central authority 
encrypts and transmits this message across the environment. As such, a 
Broadcast Encryption Scheme (   ) is defined in two phases: the key pre-
distribution phase and the broadcast phase. When the central authority is acting 
as the broadcaster under these schemes, it is called the Trusted Authority (  ) 
since it is then responsible for managing key material and encryption for its 
listeners. These listeners are then referred to as subscribers based on their need 
for initial interaction with the   . Trivial solutions exist for broadcast encryption; 
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however, in general, optimizing key pre-distribution comes at a cost of 
performance in the broadcast phase and vice versa. The goal for     design is 
to arrive at a secure and efficient trade-off between these phases. Additionally, 
more sophisticated designs offer a security assurance to the design called 
resilience. Resilience, or when a specific quantity is expressed,  -resilience is a 
measure of the number of misbehaving subscribers that are required to 
compromise the security of a    , typically by sharing their key material with one 
another.  
The majority of research into broadcast encryption schemes has gone into 
the areas of designing 1-resilient schemes, designing standalone  -resilient 
schemes, and designing  -resilient schemes that use 1-resilient schemes as a 
base ingredient. In the 1990s, a strong relationship between      and the 
existence of certain combinatorial structures called hash families was established 
[1], and subsequently, much research has gone into strengthening the 
knowledge of these two fields. Specifically, Perfect Hash Families (    ) have 
been demonstrated to provide the basis for a     construction that is efficient in 
both broadcast and key material overhead. The separation property of a     
allows for the construction of a  -resilient     from smaller instances of 1-
resilient schemes. Designing efficient algorithms for the generation of minimal or 
near-minimal      has been a well-studied problem in the last several decades. 
However, much is still unknown about their construction in general.  
While      have been shown to be very efficient in constructing  -resilient 
schemes from 1-resilient schemes, no analogous combinatorial structure has 
been created that allows for the inflation of a  -resilient scheme into a similarly 
efficient  -resilient scheme for    . Such a structure would generalize     , 
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but does not appear to be provided by the body of existing     generalizations. 
This thesis presents a new type of hash family, called a Scattering Hash Famiy 
(    ) that is shown to exhibit the desired inflation behavior. In addition to 
providing an existential analysis for these families using a variety of techniques, 
this thesis provides a direct comparison between     -based and    -based 
     using both the broadcast and key material overheads as metrics of 
performance.  
 
Overview of this Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides the basics for framing the study of hash family based 
broadcast encryption. Perfect hashing is introduced to provide a foundation for 
both the canonical    -based     as well as for the design and subsequent 
analysis of Scattering Hashing.  
Chapter 3 formalizes Broadcast Encryption Schemes and establishes the 
relationship between these schemes and     . From here, this relationship is 
generalized and subsequently, Scattering Hash Families are introduced, 
formalized, and analyzed for their broadcast encryption properties. 
Chapter 4 details the existential conditions and construction of      . The 
initial constructive and probabilistic proofs of existence for this type of hash family 
are provided. A randomized construction algorithm for       is provided and 
subsequently, using the technique of derandomization, this algorithm is used to 
create an efficient deterministic algorithm for constructing      . 
Chapter 5 incorporates the construction techniques as a foundation for the 
first empirical existential analysis for      . Subsequently, these results are 
utilized in constructing a comparison between    -based and     -based      
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on the metrics of Key Material Overhead, Broadcast Encryption Overhead, and 
Information Rates. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a discussion of the results and a brief 
discussion of future work. 
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  Chapter 2
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Perfect Hashing 
Originally motivated by optimization of compiler design, the study and design of 
Perfect Hash Families (    ) have since been extended to many different 
applications ranging from combinatorial design to cryptography. In addition to 
expanding their uses, much research has gone into generalized constructions as 
well as bounds on the various parameters [2] [3]. Of particular relevance to this 
work is the construction of minimal and near-minimal      and their applications 
to the study of Broadcast Encryption. The relevance of perfect hashing to 
broadcast encryption was established by Fiat and Naor [1] in 1994 and has stood 
as one of the predominant foundations for generating  -resilient      provided a 
minimal or near-minimal     is known for the given parameters.  
Formally, a                               is a set of functions   such 
that     : 
  {     }  {     } 
and for any subset   {     } with | |   ,      such that   is an injection on 
 . While a perfect hash function is one that maps every element of its domain to 
a unique element of its range, Perfect Hash Families can be viewed as a 
relaxation of this requirement. By necessity, a perfect hash function   {     }  
{     } would at minimum require    , but in most cases, constructions 
produce    , which is prohibitively restrictive in application. Not only are such 
functions often difficult to define on a large universe of inputs, but they also 
require a large amount of memory when    . By relaxing this property to allow 
multiple functions with the property that at least one such function will be injective 
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for any set of   elements of the domain, this overhead is greatly reduced. By 
convention [3], all Perfect Hash Families in this work are denoted             , 
which in the absence of a universally accepted representation is the most 
common form.  
At times, it is more convenient to represent a     as an array of elements 
subject to a separation constraint for all subsets of elements of a certain size. 
When viewed as an array, a                              is an     array 
populated with symbols from   where | |    in such a way that for any selection 
of   columns of the matrix, there exists at least one row such that the symbols 
contained in the intersection of this row and the selected columns are all distinct. 
Both the injective property of the function definition and the requirement for 
distinct elements in a row for the  -subsets are different ways of stating the     
separation condition. Intuitively, the separation condition is what distinguishes a 
    from all other varieties of hash families. In Section 3.2, the     separation 
condition is generalized in an as-yet unexplored fashion in the construction of 
     . 
Many techniques have been developed to generate     , ranging from 
combinatorial construction [4], probabilistic construction [5], to direct algorithmic 
approaches [6]. Each of these techniques suffers from unique drawbacks, which 
prevents their sole use in generalized     construction. Combinatorial 
constructions tend to produce elegant, simple, and often minimal instances of 
    , however, they are highly restrictive on the relationships of the parameters 
of the     and as such, do not generalize well. Figure 2.1.1 below depicts a 
minimal              that can be generated by such a method. Probabilistic 
construction is a general term for two different probabilistic approaches; the first 
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of which offers a probabilistic guarantee on the separation for all  -subsets [5], 
while the second guarantees separation while probabilistically assuring 
minimality [6]. The latter of these two approaches has produced the best known 
general bound for      and in Sections 4.2 and 5.1, it is the most successful 
technique employed for      construction in this thesis.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 1 2 3 1 
1 2 3 2 4 1 
1 2 3 3 2 3 
1 1 1 2 3 1 
3 3 3 4 2 4 
3 4 2 1 2 1 
4 4 4 2 4 4 
4 3 1 4 3 3 
 
Table 2.1.1: A Minimal              
 
For the applications considered in this work, probabilistic guarantees of 
separation for a     violate the provable perfect secrecy of      utilizing these 
     to determine key pre-distribution. Moreover, these structures are not even 
guaranteed to be      because of this property; however, some applications 
can handle this weakening by accepting the risk that certain small subsets of 
unprivileged users can decrypt the content [7].      that separate all ( 
 
)  -
subsets but only probabilistically assure minimality are often the result of greedy 
or derandomized constructions to efficiently generate     . For    -based 
    , this allows for the possibility that users are forced to store significantly 
more key material than is necessary for the scheme being deployed. These 
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properties are examined in greater detail in Section 3.1 and Section 5.3 
respectively. 
 
2.2 Broadcast Encryption 
Broadcast Encryption is the cryptographic problem wherein a centralized Trusted 
Authority (  ) desires to transmit a message across a broadcast medium that is 
encrypted in such a fashion that only a particular, dynamic subset of subscribed 
listeners can decrypt and observe the message. Such a scheme not only needs 
to protect against non-subscribed listeners, but also against valid, registered 
subscribers who are not entitled to decrypt the contents of a given message. 
Formally, a Broadcast Encryption Scheme is represented as          , 
indicating it is a scheme on   subscribed listeners with a resilience against 
colluding parties of size at most  . Traditionally, the broadcast message is the 
encryption key to a large message that has been encrypted with a strong 
symmetric algorithm such as AES [8], which is broadcast after the secure 
distribution of the encryption key. For this reason, it is often the goal to restrict 
the focus of designing      to those in which a single message   is chosen to 
persist throughout a large amount of content distribution with infrequent 
modifications to the privileged subset. The most famous instance of this type of 
scheme is the AACS content protection scheme applied to Blu-Ray discs [8]. In 
this scheme, a sufficiently large     size is chosen and the     is deployed to 
each licensed Blu-Ray player manufacturer. Each Blu-Ray disc is encrypted with 
a key   and the sale combined with the ease of copying the encrypted content 
on the discs is analogous to a broadcast in the traditional sense. 
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While the size of a     is determined simply by the number of subscribers, 
resilience is crucial, but is not so easily determined. In [9], Luby and Staddon 
prove lower bounds on key material requirements and message overhead in the 
circumstances of     or      , which are reasonable bounds for pay-per-
view TV     , but not necessarily for all applications. Although it is true for most 
memory efficient schemes that selecting a higher resilience results in the need 
for much higher amounts of pre-distributed key material, in practice, the selection 
of resilience for a     is rooted deeper in procedural, practical, or economic 
restrictions than it is in mathematics [9] [10]. Consider a pay-per-view TV 
service’s broadcast encryption model. Subscribers are customers of the content 
provider (  ) who have registered for this service and have had a box delivered 
to their house, which among other functions, serves as a tamper-proof storage 
device for the subscriber’s key material. The necessary resilience in this situation 
is based on a risk analysis of subscribers successfully tampering with their 
boxes, spoofing registration to obtain multiple boxes, and reaching out 
undetected to other parties desiring to circumvent the scheme. If these factors 
can be mitigated to a nominal degree, the     deployed can utilize a smaller 
resilience. 
 An analysis of broadcast encryption would be incomplete without 
considering the varied extensions of broadcast encryption that have been 
discovered since its inception. In its initial form, broadcast encryption was based 
solely around the concept of providing resilience against a colluding party of 
unprivileged users of at most a certain size [1]. When the colluding party exceeds 
this threshold, this subset of unprivileged users is able to freely decrypt content 
at will. Traitor-tracing [11] [12] [13] is a natural extension to resilience, and allows 
10 
 
 
the    to identify some subset of the colluding party when a compromise occurs 
and prevents these members from framing an innocent subscriber for their 
actions. This technique is widely used in protecting against unlawful reproduction 
of licensed software [14]. These schemes put members of a colluding party in 
direct risk of discovery, which effectively protects against unwanted distribution 
by severely de-incentivizing this behavior. Stinson, Trung, and Wei [15] provide a 
detailed analysis of the use of hash families in the production of frame-proof and 
traitor-tracing codes, a key ingredient in the construction of several such Traitor-
Tracing Schemes (    ).   
 In addition to the ability to identify adversarial subscribers, it is desired that 
methods of broadcast encryption include the ability to revoke a set of keys 
associated with one or more subscribers. Revocation is the ability to remove a 
subscriber’s ability to decrypt all future broadcasts by rendering those keys 
useless. In simple     , this can be performed at the    by removing any 
revoked subscribers from the privileged subset   before broadcasting the 
message. Simple     , however, lack the ability to actually trace a traitor, since 
the fully decrypted content is the same for all users. The AACS [8]     
previously mentioned incorporates both of these concepts into an efficient trace-
revoke scheme that can not only detect the type of Blu-Ray player that has been 
compromised, but will also render the class of Blu-Ray players used in this 
compromise unable to play any future releases.  
Formally, a           is defined to be a broadcast encryption scheme 
with   pre-registered subscribers that must be resilient against colluding parties 
of non-privileged listeners of size at most  . A           consists of two 
phases, the first of which is the pre-distribution phase during which keys are 
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generated, arranged, and distributed to the set of subscribers  . The second 
phase is the broadcast phase in which a message   is produced and encrypted 
based on the desired privileged subset     and is then transmitted across the 
broadcast medium. While, in general,     resilience can be defined as a 
probabilistic guarantee that colluding parties cannot decrypt a particular message 
[7], the scope of this thesis restricts this definition to deterministic resilience so 
that, definitively, no  -subset of unprivileged subscribers is able to decrypt any 
broadcast message  . There exist several trivial solutions to this problem [1] 
[16], two of which are provided below. Each of these schemes represents one 
extreme in the trade-off of key material overhead versus broadcast length. In 
practice, both of these extremes are avoided in favor of schemes that provide an 
efficient compromise between these two factors. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1: A Naïve     with Large Broadcast Encryption Overhead 
Pre-distribution Phase: 
 Let 𝐾  be the set of all subscribers of the 𝐵𝐸𝑆. 
 Generate 𝐾  distinct symmetric keys uniformly at random and pre-
distribute one to each subscriber 𝑠  𝐾.  
Broadcast Phase: 
 For broadcast message 𝑀, let 𝑃  𝐾 be the privileged subset. 
 When sending message 𝑀, the 𝑇𝐴 produces |𝑃| copies of the 
message and encrypts each copy with the key of a member of the 
privileged subset. 
 The 𝑇𝐴 broadcasts all |𝑃| encrypted versions of 𝑀 in succession: 
𝐸  𝑀  𝐸  𝑀    𝐸|𝑃| 𝑀 . 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2: A Naïve     with Large Key Material Overhead 
 
 The first method with large broadcast overhead is perhaps the most 
intuitive     design. Each subscriber gets one personal symmetric key that the 
   uses to encrypt a copy of the message  . In this scheme, the broadcast 
message must be encrypted and re-broadcast for each user in the privileged 
subset  . This scheme’s broadcast overhead thus scales linearly with both the 
size of the broadcast message as well as the size of  , which is prohibitively 
expensive. The second method with large key material overhead optimizes the 
Pre-distribution Phase: 
 Let 𝐾  be the set of all subscribers of the 𝐵𝐸𝑆. 
 Generate  |𝐾| distinct symmetric keys uniformly at random, each 
corresponding to one possible subset of subscribers from the 
set of all subsets of 𝐾, Ƥ 𝐾 .  
 For every subscriber 𝑠  𝐾,  let Ƥ𝑠 𝐾  denote the set of subsets 
that contain subscriber 𝑠. For all 𝑠, distribute to this subscriber 
every symmetric key corresponding to a subset in Ƥ𝑠 𝐾 .  
Broadcast Phase: 
 For broadcast message 𝑀, let 𝑃 be the privileged subset of 
subscribers. 
 When sending message 𝑀, the 𝑇𝐴 selects the key 
corresponding to the privileged subset  𝑃  Ƥ 𝐾  and encrypts 
𝑀 with this key 
 The 𝑇𝐴 broadcasts the single message 𝐸𝑃 𝑀 . 
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broadcast down to a single message; however, even for small instances of this 
scheme, each subscriber’s key storage is  | |   keys, which is, once again, 
prohibitively expensive. Fiat and Naor [1], among others, demonstrated that for 
broadcast encryption to be practical, an efficient trade-off between these two 
factors must be obtained.  
 
2.3 Randomization and Derandomization 
Randomization is a powerful tool in the design of algorithms that, rather than 
relying on making decisions on the input in a fixed, iterative fashion, instead 
harnesses a secondary input of uniformly distributed random bits to govern the 
operation or output of the algorithm. Randomized algorithms are split into two 
major categories based on how the randomness is utilized: Monte Carlo 
algorithms offer deterministic run time while only probabilistically guaranteeing 
veracity of output whereas Las Vegas algorithms may fail to terminate but always 
produce a correct result upon termination. Historically, the primary motivating 
factor in designing randomized algorithms is the desire to obtain practical results 
in an efficient manner in the absence of a known efficient deterministic technique. 
Contextual evidence of this phenomenon exists in the study of primality testing of 
integers [17] [18], escaping local minima/maxima during Simulated Annealing 
[19], and in the construction of convex hulls and polytopes, all of which produced 
efficient randomized algorithms years or even decades before deterministic 
techniques of equivalent computational complexity were discovered.  
The probabilistic guarantees provided by these algorithms are sometimes 
undesirable in practice. Derandomization involves removing the randomness 
from a probabilistic algorithm while maintaining or even improving upon its 
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performance in either solution strength or computational complexity. Of particular 
importance to this work is the derandomization of probabilistic, non-constructive 
proofs of existence into efficient and constructive deterministic algorithms. 
Probabilistic non-constructive proofs of existence for various hash families have 
been analyzed in depth [5], and in many cases yield the lowest known bounds for 
minimality. While these results are useful for asymptotic analysis, applications of 
these hash families require actual constructions to be utilized. Despite this fact, 
the analysis of randomized algorithms may reveal core properties inherent to a 
particular combinatorial problem. In certain cases, these properties can be 
harnessed in a deterministic fashion as long as certain constraints are 
maintained during the derandomization.  
Section 4.1 describes a randomized proof of existence for       that 
follows a general approach shown to be successful for many other types of hash 
families [6]. This proof analyzes the probability that a randomly generated array 
will fail to meet the      separation condition for all  -subsets of columns. As the 
number of rows increases, this probability decreases and once it reaches a 
certain point, there must exist some array of this size that meets the separation 
condition and thus, a      of the current parameters must exist. By utilizing the 
Method of Conditional Expectation [20], this proof is systematically derandomized 
into a polynomial-time deterministic      construction algorithm, which is 
subsequently analyzed in Section 5.1.  
 
 
2.4 Post-Optimization and  -Restrictions 
In combinatorial design, it is often the case that when analyzing a new structure, 
the existing construction methods produce sub-optimal results. Optimality in 
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terms of hash family construction is measured in output size. The smaller the 
constructed family, the stronger it is considered. Advanced techniques for 
constructing small instances tend to evolve out of earlier naïve approaches [6]. 
For hash families as well as other array-based constraint satisfaction designs, 
constructions tend to suffer from a trade-off between simplicity of construction 
and runtime, guarantee of constraint satisfaction, and minimality [2] [5] [6]. When 
constructing instances of these designs on large parameters, the time complexity 
of the chosen algorithm becomes increasingly important. As demonstrated in the 
derandomized      and     construction algorithms in Section 4.2, ensuring 
that execution occurs in an efficient manner tends to sacrifice minimality of 
design in favor of polynomial time complexity. 
 Despite the fact that the constructions produced by these algorithms are in 
general not minimal, these results can be refined via a technique called post-
optimization. Post-optimization is a type of combinatorial optimization approach 
that operates a posteriori on the output of a separate construction for a given 
combinatorial design. Essentially, it is the technique of taking a suboptimal 
solution to open problems such as covering array or hash family construction and 
improving upon the strength of the solution. 
 Post-optimization has been shown to be highly successful for improving 
known bounds of minimality for Covering Arrays (   ) and several well-known 
forms of hash families including Perfect, Separating, and Distributing Hash 
Families; referred to as     ,     , and      respectively [21]. This work 
defines a randomized post-optimization technique that operates on a set of 
designs called  -restriction problems. Each of the structures are shown to be 
instances of a  -restriction problem, and once represented as such, are post-
16 
 
 
optimized using necessity analysis on a symbol-by-symbol basis. The 
optimization on the array occurs when an entire row is determined to be 
unnecessary to the structure and is discarded, thus providing a smaller instance, 
which is a stronger solution. Formally,  -restriction problems are defined as 
follows [22]: 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1: Definition of  -Restriction Problems 
 
By formalizing Scattering Hash Families as a  -restriction problem and 
subsequently performing  -restriction-based post-optimization on known 
instances, the non-minimal instances generated by the derandomized 
construction in Section 4.2 are post-optimized in an attempt to strengthen the 
known bounds of minimality for      . The results of this post-optimization are 
analyzed in Section 5.2. 
  
 
1. The input is an alphabet Ʃ of size |Ʃ|  q, a length 𝑚, and a set of 𝑠 
possible demands: 𝑓𝑖 Ʃ
k  {   },   𝑖  𝑠. For every   𝑖  𝑠, there 
exists 𝑎  Ʃk so that 𝑓𝑖 𝑎   . 
2. The task is to prepare a set 𝐴  Ʃm so that: For any choice of 𝑘 
indices   𝑖𝑖  ⋯  𝑖𝑘  𝑚, and a demand 𝑗,   𝑗  𝑠, there is 
some 𝑎  𝐴 such that 𝑓𝑗(𝑎 𝑖   𝑎 𝑖𝑘 )   . 
3. The smaller |𝐴| is, the higher the quality of the solution. 
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  Chapter 3
BROADCAST ENCRYPTION 
3.1 Fiat-Naor Broadcast Encryption 
The Fiat-Naor     [1] is essentially a technique of extending a 1-resilient     to 
a  -reslilient     through the use of Perfect Hash Families. In order to 
accomplish this, an arbitrary 1-reslient     is selected as the base ingredient for 
the larger scheme. From here, the construction requires a     whose 
parameters match those of the desired    ; that is whose number of columns 
equals the number of subscribers and whose strength corresponds to the desired 
resilience of the    . The innovative aspect of this technique is revealed in how 
the provided     is used to inflate the resiliency. The rows of the     are 
treated as partitions of the columns based on the symbols appearing in the    . 
From here, every partition of every row is assigned an independent 1-resilient 
   . In their initial work [1], Fiat and Naor demonstrate several such ingredient 
    . Subsequently, these schemes have been analyzed in depth [16] and other 
memory-efficient alternatives have been proposed [23]. 
The result of applying the ingredient      is that each user is assigned 
keys for every partition of the     in which they are present. In order to securely 
broadcast a message to an arbitrary privileged subset of users, the    randomly 
generates components         so that    
       where   is the number of 
rows of the    . The components of the message are then encrypted with the 
keys in such a fashion as to allow only privileged users the ability to decrypt, 
while offering no information about   to colluding parties of size   or smaller. A 
detailed proof of this concept is given in Section 3.5 in the context of          , 
however, the information-theoretic properties are the same. 
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In order to analyze the Fiat-Naor construction as well as to provide a 
concrete ingredient     for the          construction in Section 3.3, the 
following process details the key pre-distribution and broadcast protocol of a 
                . In a broadcast environment consisting of     subscribers, it 
is desired to create a     whose broadcasts are resilient against colluding 
parties of unprivileged subscribers of size     or smaller. The     will be 
constructed from the     in Figure 3.1.1. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 1 2 2 
1 1 2 1 2 
1 2 1 1 2 
 
Table 3.1.1: A                
 
Once the     has been obtained, for each row         , partition the 
column indices based on the elements appearing in this row. Let     be the label 
for the     partition in row   . On each partition    , create an instance of a 1-
resilient     on     subscribers where     |   | is the size of the partition and 
distribute the keys according to this    .  
 
    {     } {   }      
    {     } {   }      
    {     } {   }      
 
Table 3.1.2: Symbolic Partitions for              
19 
 
 
 Let the 1-resilient ingredient     selected be the following: for each 
member of partition    , first distribute a Null-key      to each member. The Null-
key prevents subscribers from outside of this partition from recovering the 
message component    to be broadcast on this partition. Then, for each 
subscriber   present in the partition, generate a key      and distribute this key to 
every member of the partition except  . Repeating this     for all partitions 
results in the subscribers of this     receiving the keys according to Table 3.1.3. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
                 
                 
                 
             
             
                 
                 
                 
             
             
                 
                 
                 
             
             
 
Table 3.1.3: Fiat-Naor Key Distribution Pattern for              
 
 Once the pre-distribution phase has been completed, the broadcast phase 
is performed as follows. Let   be the privileged subset of subscribers and let 
    {  |          } be the set of columns in partition     that are disjoint from 
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 .  Now, let      represent the result of xor composition of all      where      . 
For broadcast message  , randomly generate message components         
so that    
      . Then, for every partition    , the final computed values will 
be the set of messages:                  
 
                      
                 
                 
                      
                 
                      
 
Figure 3.1.4: Final Broadcast Content for     on               
 
 The concatenation of all     is the encrypted value for broadcast message 
 .  In the           constructed above, broadcasting message   with a 
privileged subset   {   }, the broadcast would then be the concatenation of 
the encrypted components in Figure 3.1.4. 
 
 
3.2 Introducing Scattering Hash Families 
The core motivation behind this entire thesis is the following series of questions: 
If a              can be used to inflate a 1-resilient     into a  -resilient     
that is efficient in both broadcast and key material overhead, what kind of 
construction can be used to inflate      of resilience    ? What type of 
combinatorial structure assures this property while still offering strong 
performance in both broadcast length and key material storage? And finally, what 
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are the advantages and disadvantages of such a scheme over existing     
techniques? 
 After analyzing the gamut of hash family variations, it was determined that 
no existing hash family met this criteria. Among the variations,      were the 
closest, providing the same security as with the Fiat-Naor     but with 
significantly increased key material overhead. Since      offer tighter 
combinatorial restrictions on the  -subsets to inflate weaker     , this result is as 
expected. Separating Hash Families (    ), Distributing Hash Families (    ), 
and their variants weaken the separation condition for      in such a way as to 
violate the unconditional security of the inflated    . Specifically, this is due to 
both variants addressing partitions of  -subsets and only enforcing separation 
requirements between classes of partitions. Since no restriction is placed upon 
the relationship between the elements within a partition itself, the     
construction loses its guarantee of separation.  
It then remains to determine a generalization of      that takes advantage 
of the higher strength of ingredient schemes yet still offers the desired security 
under the provided construction model. Rather than partitioning  -subsets and 
redefining separation conditions based on these partitions, this generalization 
needs to enforce a variable multiplicity cap on the symbols in each subset. With 
these parameters in consideration, Scattering Hash Families (     ) are 
defined. 
 Formally, a                                   is a set of functions   
such that     : 
  {     }  {     } 
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and for any subset   {     } with | |   ,      such that for each symbol 
  {     }, the image      maps to the symbol   at most   times. Following the 
chosen notation for     , Scattering Hash Families are represented as 
               . The term “Scattering” was chosen to convey the relaxation in 
separation requirements from a    . Within a  -subset, elements can clump 
together to a certain degree, but overall they need to be scattered fairly 
uniformly. 
When viewed as an array, a                                    is an 
    array populated with symbols from   where | |    in such a way that for 
any selection of   columns of the matrix, there exists at least one row such that 
the symbols contained in the intersection of this row and the selected columns 
appear   or fewer times. The construction and combinatorial properties of       
are covered in detail throughout Sections 4.1 and 4.2 and the scalable, ingredient 
independent          is the primary focus of the following section. 
 Within a                , let |  | represent the number of occurrences of 
symbol   in row   for every symbol   {     }. When, for all  ,      , 
     , |  |  |  |, this      is called homogeneous. This is primarily an 
application-driven definition placed upon this hash family, which is further 
explored in Section 3.6 and utilized in the construction of a          in Section 
3.4.  
 
 
3.3 A Broadcast Encryption Scheme Based on       
As described in the previous section,       were designed for the purpose of 
constructing      from ingredient      of strength     while taking advantage 
of the increased ingredient strength in order to loosen the combinatorial 
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restriction on the hash family that determines the final key pre-distribution.       
achieve this by generalizing the  -subset separation condition from requiring 
complete element distinction to enforcing a multiplicity cap   per element. The 
construction of the          draws on the techniques used in the Fiat-Naor     
construction [1] and throughout this thesis, all           constructed and 
analyzed utilize multiple instances of this construction for the ingredient     . It 
is important to note that, by its definition, the scheme itself is agnostic to the 
ingredient      used in construction. Any  -resilient     can be used in place of 
the Fiat-Naor schemes used in this work. The choice to analyze only Fiat-Naor 
ingredient schemes was made to provide an initial scope for the analysis of the 
properties of this scheme. 
Given a                 , the central    can construct a  -resilient     
with   | | subscribers from  -resilient ingredient      as follows. For all rows 
of the     , partition each row by the symbols present. Let     be the label for 
the     partition in the     row of the     . For each partition    , construct a  -
resilient     and deploy the symmetric keys accordingly. The          is 
generalized in such a way that no specific type of     is required for this stage 
and, moreover, the ingredient      do not need to be the of same type, so long 
as they are all  -resilient. For the sake of selection, however, construct a  -
resilient     in the fashion described in Section 3.1. Now, for all     construct a 
        |   |        and from this, construct a Fiat-Naor    . Then, for all     
and for each subscriber       , distribute symmetric keys according to this    .  
Once the key pre-distribution method has been deployed, the    uses the 
following broadcast protocol. Let   be the message being broadcasted and let 
  Ƥ    be the privileged subset of subscribers for this broadcast. Beginning 
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with the same technique described in Section 3.1, generate         random 
component messages of length | | such that 
             
where   is the number of rows of the     . Instead of directly encrypting each of 
these message components, the          breaks down the message once 
more and encrypts each sub-component according to each partition’s Fiat-Naor 
scheme. To do so, generate                for all        , such that 
                  . 
For every partition     of the     , consider the         |   |         that 
was constructed and deployed as a     on this partition. Within this    , retain 
the original      column indexing for continuity of representation. Let     denote 
the     partition of the     row of the     and let     {  |          } be the 
set of columns in partition     that are disjoint from  . Now, let        represent 
the xor composition of all        where      . For each partition    , construct 
the set of encrypted message components:                          . For 
all      partitions     and for all     partitions     corresponding to each    , 
the encrypted broadcast is the concatenation of all      : 
 
   :                        . 
  
   :                         
  
   :                          
 
Figure 3.3.1: The Final Broadcast Content for a          
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The formal definition of the          is given in Figure 3.3.2 and Figure 
3.3.3. This is the scheme that is used for the direct comparison with the Fiat-Naor 
        in Section 5.3. As a step towards producing that comparison, a means 
of computing the efficiency of a     by measuring its information rate is 
introduced. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2: Pre-distribution Phase of a     -Based     
 
Pre-distribution Phase: 
 Let 𝐾  be the set of all subscribers of the 𝐵𝐸𝑆 with |𝐾|  𝑘 and let 
𝑆  𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 𝑁 𝑘 𝑣 𝑤 𝑡 . 
 For every row 𝑅𝑖    𝑖  𝑁, partition the set of columns by symbol into 
partitions 𝑝𝑖𝑗, which represents the 𝑗
𝑡  partition of row 𝑅𝑖.  
 For each partition 𝑝𝑖𝑗, construct a 𝑃𝐻𝐹 𝑁𝑖𝑗 |𝑝𝑖𝑗| 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑤  and from this, 
construct a Fiat-Naor 𝐾𝑃𝑆. For all 𝑝𝑖𝑗 and for each subscriber 𝑠  𝑝𝑖𝑗, 
distribute keys according to this 𝐾𝑃𝑆, preserving the original column 
indexing. 
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Figure 3.3.3: Broadcast Phase of a     -Based     
 
When designing Broadcast Encryption Schemes, it is useful to be able to 
meaningfully compare them to one another in terms of their performance. The 
information rate of a     is one such metric [16]. The information rate can be 
framed as the efficiency with which a     distributes secret information to a user. 
Formally, the information rate of a     is defined as 
     {
    
     
      } 
Broadcast Phase: 
 For broadcast message 𝑀, let 𝑃  𝐾 be the privileged subset. 
 Construct component messages 𝑀  𝑀    𝑀𝑁 of size |𝑀| uniformly at 
random such that 𝑀  𝑀  𝑀    𝑀𝑁.  
 For every 𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 partition 𝑝𝑖𝑗, consider the 𝑃𝐻𝐹 𝑁𝑖𝑗 |𝑝𝑖𝑗| 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑤   
deployed on this partition, but retain the original 𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 column indexing: 
o The broadcast message for this partition is 𝑀𝑖, construct 
components 𝑀     𝑀 𝑁𝑖𝑗such that 𝑀𝑖  𝑀     𝑀 𝑁𝑖𝑗 . 
o Let 𝑝𝑎𝑏 denote the 𝑏
𝑡  partition of the 𝑎𝑡  row of the 𝑃𝐻𝐹 and let 
𝐿𝑎𝑏  {𝑠 | 𝑠  𝑝𝑎𝑏  𝑠  𝑃} Now, let 𝐾𝐿𝑎𝑏  represent ⨁𝐾𝑎𝑏𝑙 
 𝑙  𝐿𝑎𝑏. 
o For each partition 𝑝𝑎𝑏, construct the set of encrypted message 
components: 𝑌𝑎𝑏  𝑀𝑖𝑎  𝐾𝑎𝑏  𝐾𝐿𝑎𝑏. 
 For all 𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 partitions 𝑝𝑖𝑗 and for all 𝑃𝐻𝐹 partitions 𝑝𝑎𝑏 corresponding 
to each 𝑝𝑖𝑗, broadcast 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑏  𝑀𝑖𝑎  𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑏  𝐾𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑎𝑏 . 
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where    is the set of all possible secret values that can be distributed to 
subscriber  , and       is the familiar entropy function, which measures the 
uncertainty associated with the random variable   . Alternatively, as formalized 
by Shannon [24], this value is measuring the information content missing by not 
knowing value of the random variable. In this definition, it is assumed that all 
keys         , the Galois Field of prime or prime power order  . For this 
reason,       has already been reduced to      in the equation. In this situation, 
the actual key selection method is irrelevant because the information rate being 
computed is the ratio between two key entropies and therefore, the entropic 
value specific to the key selection cancels out.  
When constructed upon a             , the information rate of a Fiat-
Naor     has been shown to be: 
  
 
  
 
which is directly calculable from the parameters of the     deployed. In this 
scheme, the amount of secret information being delivered is      , where    is 
the key associated with the privileged subset of a given broadcast. In order to 
obtain this, the scheme distributes 
 
 
 keys to every user per partition of the    . 
Since there are     partitions, the information content of the distributed key 
material is: 
    
 
 
                
And thus, the ratio of these information contents results in the rate: 
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Now, to determine the information rate of the         , it remains to 
formulate  the amount of distributed key material is required by this scheme. On 
a                   with an ingredient     built on                 , there will 
be                 keys distributed to each subscriber. That is, for all of the 
          partitions, each user receives the amount of key material defined in 
the Fiat-Naor Scheme above, specifically            keys per    . Due to the 
relationships between the parameters of this      and     as enforced by this 
scheme, the size of these families are related by          when    is chosen 
minimally. The information rate for the          is then:  
  
     
           
 
 
      
 
 This value will be used as one means of measuring the storage efficiency 
between the    -based      and the     -based     . The inverse value of 
this ratio is defined as the Key Material Overhead (   ), which gives an 
indication as to the number of keys distributed to each user in order to determine 
the feasibility of deploying such a scheme. As demonstrated by the two naïve 
     in Section 2.2, this value alone is not enough to determine the quality of a 
   . Complementary to the information rate is the Broadcast Encryption 
Overhead (   ) and both of these metrics are utilized extensively in Chapter 5 to 
form a meaningful comparison between the two     designs. 
 
 
3.4 The Construction of a          
Consider the construction of a Broadcast Encryption Scheme on      
subscribers with resilience against colluding parties of size at most    .  For 
this scheme, any ingredient     of resilience       may be chosen, 
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however,     restricts the      into a     and     is a trivial      of one 
row, as demonstrated in Section 3.6. For this reason, a                  is a 
reasonable choice in this scheme. This family is a minimal      matching the 
dimensions and strength requirements for the     desired. The following is a 
construction of a            utilizing the          as defined in Figure 3.3.2.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Table 3.4.1: A                  
 
After generating the                 , partition the column indices of 
every row           , based on the symbol appearing at that location. Let     
be the label for the     partition in row   . Note that in this     , for every    , 
|   |   . In this instance, this phenomenon is due to the fact that the selected 
     is homogeneous, allowing the construction of a          from a single 
ingredient    . In general, all partitions are not required to be of the same size; 
however,           lacking this property require the construction of multiple 
ingredient      to apply to the partitions of each dimension present.  
 
    {         } {          }      
    {         } {          }      
    {         } {          }      
 
Table 3.4.2: Symbolic Partitions for                  
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On every partition    , create a  -resilient     on    . Let each of these be 
a  |   |   -Fiat-Naor    . Each instance of these      needs to be constructed 
from a         |   |     , which has precisely the parameters of the     and 
    constructed in Section 3.1.  For each      partition    , and for each 
partition     of the     applied to    , distribute the set of keys        where 
  {     }  { } to the subscribers in accordance with each    . The key 
distribution pattern is given in Figures 3.4.3, 3.4.4, and 3.4.5. For broadcast 
message   and a privileged subset of subscribers  , the explicit final broadcast 
is given in Figure 3.4.2. 
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Figure 3.4.3: Final Broadcast Content for       -         
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Table 3.4.4:          Key Pre-distribution for     and     
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Table 3.4.5:          Key Pre-distribution for     and     
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Table 3.4.6:          Key Pre-distribution for     and     
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3.5 Unconditional Security of the     -Based     
As demonstrated in Section 3.3, the broadcast message   is broken up into 
component messages         and each component is encrypted and 
broadcast in such a way as to deter an adversary or colluding party of 
adversaries from collecting enough pieces to reassemble  . In this section, the 
proof of security for     -based      is given in detail.  
To begin, assume an adversary is able to recover all    for      . This 
adversary will be able to trivially recover   by computing the xor of all these 
values. Now, assume an adversary is only able to recover     component 
messages from        . Without loss of generality, let the missing component 
be  . Let  
                
denote the exclusive-or of the recoverable components of  . The equation for   
can then be simplified to        . Exclusive-oring both sides by    results 
in        , the familiar form of the One-Time Pad encryption scheme in 
which  is the plaintext,    is the secret random key of bit length | |, and    is 
the exposed ciphertext. Following the famous information-theoretic results of 
Shannon [24], this scheme has the property that the entropy of message   given 
the possession of ciphertext    is exactly equal to the entropy of message   
itself, represented traditionally as    |        . The implications of this 
property in this     construction are that not only can an adversary not recover 
  in its entirety when recovering at most     component messages, but also 
having done so reveals not even one bit of information about  to the adversary. 
In order to demonstrate the security of this          construction, it now 
remains to show that the scheme ensures that any adversary or colluding party 
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of adversaries of at most   members can recover no more than     component 
messages. 
 For every partition     of the     , message component    is encrypted in 
the following fashion:    :                   where      represents the xor 
composition of all      where       and the tuple       iterates over all 
partitions of the     applied to the              partition. By encrypting each 
message sub-component with the keys that the disjoint set      are missing, 
each     protects against colluding parties of size at most  .  Now, since the 
     splits each message component in such a way that some row ensures that 
no more than   members of a colluding party are in the same partition for any 
choice of   colluding partners, this row prevents the recovery of one    . As 
demonstrated in Section 3.1, in order for an adversary to obtain  , it is 
necessary to obtain all        . In turn, since these values are merely the xor 
composition of all            , the following is the computation for : 
                                         
 Thus, in order to obtain  , an adversary must recover all           
        [24]. It has been shown that there exists at least one     that a 
colluding party of size   or smaller cannot obtain and as such, this scheme is 
secure. While some broadcast encryption methods offer some probabilistic 
security against colluding parties greater than the defined resilience [7], this 
scheme is immediately broken upon the         member entering the colluding 
party. It is a necessary restriction that no more than   columns be chosen since 
the      does not guarantee separation for subsets of any larger size, even if 
many such subsets are indeed separated. 
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3.6 Properties of     -Based      
When starting with a fixed            , constructing a          from this     
will obey the properties listed below. As introduced in Section 3.2, the      
utilized in this construction will necessarily be homogeneous. Let the final      
be represented by  :                .  
 
Lemma 3.6.1: When a                is constructed from a single fixed 
ingredient             and utilizing a homogeneous                , then 
  |  . 
 
Lemma 3.6.2: When a                is constructed from a single fixed 
ingredient             and utilizing a homogeneous                , 
then     
 
Since the ingredient     is fixed by choice, Lemma 3.6.1 is a direct result of 
the homogenous ingredient restriction. Each row contains   columns which must 
be able to be partitioned into an integral number of partitions of size   , thus 
  |  . 
Lemma 3.6.2 follows from the security property of the      scheme. By      
definition, for each  -subset   of  , there must exist at least one row in which no 
symbol appears more than   times. Accordingly, the      applied to each 
partition must be resilient against colluding parties of size at least  .  
Assume to the contrary that     . Let    represent the row of   that 
guarantees separation for the  -subset   . If any of the      elements located at 
      are repeated   times, as allowed by the parameters of  , the     applied 
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to the partition containing these elements does not secure against colluding 
parties of size   and as such, the message component encrypted by this 
partition is no longer provably unrecoverable. Using the notation presented in 
Section 3.5, this message component corresponds to   , the singular message 
component that is required to be unrecoverable to prevent recovery of  . The 
assumption      thus violates the security property of the          proven 
Section 3.5 and so it must be that     . 
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  Chapter 4
CONSTRUCTING SCATTERING HASH FAMILIES 
4.1 Theoretic Results on the Existence of       
Following are theorems pertaining to the existence of Scattering Hash Families 
for various restrictions of parameters. A formalization of the     generalization 
claims for       is given in Theorem 4.1.1. As was proven for      [3], there 
exist certain conditions under which a      can be trivially constructed in one 
row. Theorem 4.1.2 provides bounds for the existence of these trivial       
which are demonstrated via constructive proof. Theorems 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 provide 
some introductory insight into the existence of minimal       under specific sets 
of parameters. Finally, Theorem 4.1.5 is a     -specific result that follows from 
the work of Stein [25], Lovász [26], and Johnson [27] that lay the framework for 
generalized hash family bounds. This theorem relies on properties of randomly 
generated arrays and is the primary focus of the derandomization in Section 4.2. 
 
Theorem 4.1.1:      are a subclass of      . By enforcing a multiplicity cap of 
   , the separation condition for a      enforces every  -subset to be mapped 
to distinct symbols in some row of the structure. As such, any construction of a 
    is a construction of a      with    .  
 
Proof: Let                   be a Scattering Hash Family. By definition,    
is a set of functions   such that     : 
  {     }  {     } 
and for any subset   {     } with | |   ,      such that for each symbol 
  {     }, the image      maps to the symbol   at most   times. In this 
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instance,     and accordingly, the image of any  -subset   is a set of elements 
whose symbols are repeated at most once. Therefore, all elements of this image 
are distinct, providing the necessary separation condition for   to be a 
            . □ 
 
Theorem 4.1.2: When       or     , a      exists on 1 row.  
 
Proof: Let   be a sequence of elements    from the set    {     }. For some 
   , populate   in the following fashion:  
  {                      } 
This array contains     elements, in which no element is repeated more than   
times. Trivially, no subset      of size       has any symbol repeated 
more than   times. Moreover, for any subset of size   of   , no symbol can be 
repeated more than   times as well. This construction is therefore a 
               . Additionally, for any subset of size  , it is impossible for any 
symbol to repeated more than   times, so for all    , the same construction 
applies. □ 
 
Theorem 4.1.3: If a                 exists where    , then there is some 
     for which a                    exists.  
 
Proof: Let                    be a Scattering Hash Family. By the array 
definition of      , this family is a     array and has the property that for any 
 -subset, there exists a row such that the symbols appearing in this row and the 
column indices appear no more than   times. Let   {       } be the set of 
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elements appearing in one such  -subset. Let   be the symbol with the highest 
occurrence    among elements   . Now, for any subset    of these elements of 
size       , where     , either   
       in the case that   is the unique 
symbol of highest frequency and a copy of   was removed, or        in the 
case that a different symbol was removed and   is therefore still the most 
frequent. Since, by definition of   ,     , it is the case that   
       and as 
such, there exists some                      . In this instance,    provides 
existence for     , however, since the size of subsets being considered has 
decreased, it may be possible to express    in fewer rows, thus     . □ 
 
Theorem 4.1.4: If a                 exists, then there is some      for 
which a                    exists. 
 
Proof: The proof of this follows that of Theorem 4.1.3. Let                    
be a Scattering Hash Family.    is an     array of symbols from the set 
{     }. Let   {       } be the set of elements appearing in any  -subset of 
columns. Let   be the symbol with the highest occurrence    among elements   . 
The inequality      is necessary for    to be a      and so it is trivially the 
case that       . Since this holds for any  -subset of elements in the array,  
   is therefore a                    . As with Theorem 4.1.3, this existence is 
proven for     , but a smaller instance may exist due to the relaxed separation 
requirements and so     . □ 
 
In Section 3.3, the method was shown for constructing      from      , 
but it remains to demonstrate the existence of these hash families for reasonable 
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parameters. As an initial step in this effort, a non-constructive proof of existence 
for       is provided in Theorem 4.1.5. The core property of this proof is that it 
harnesses the probabilistic separation of a randomly generated  -subset to 
determine an upper bound on the number of rows required to ensure that for 
some array of this size, all  -subsets are     -separated and thus a      of 
these parameters necessarily exists. In order to determine the expected 
separation, the procedure                is defined as follows.  
 
 
Figure 4.1.1: Definition of                function 
 
Theorem 4.1.5: For any nonnegative integers        , if: 
 
  (
 
 
) (  
              
  
)
 
 
 
then there exists a                 . The function                is defined in 
Figure 4.1.1. 
input:  𝑣:  Size of the set of symbols 
  𝑡:  The number of positions being filled with symbols 
  𝑤   Maximum number of times a symbol can appear 
  
output:  The number of ways that a set of 𝑡 positions can be populated by 
symbols from {    𝑣} in such a way that no symbol is repeated 
more than 𝑤 times. Specifically, this is the number of ways a 𝑡-
subset will meet the 𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 separation condition. 
 
procedure 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 𝑣 𝑤 𝑡 : 
begin 
 if 𝑣    and 𝑡    then 
return 0 
else if 𝑣    then 
return 1 
else 
return   (𝑡
𝑖
)  𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 𝑣    𝑤 𝑡  𝑖 
min 𝑤 𝑡 
𝑖   
end 
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Proof: Let   be a     array consisting of symbols chosen uniformly at random 
from   {     }. Consider any  -subset of columns   {     }. Since the 
elements are chosen randomly, the expectation that this  -subset is separated in 
a given row is simply the number of ways to separate this  -subset divided by all 
possible row values. The procedure         is a recursive routine that computes 
the number of ways to arrange at most   copies of a symbol into   distinct 
positions, known commonly as the multiset coefficient. This is precisely the 
number of possible ways to     -separate a subset of size  . There are    ways 
to populate this row, so the quantity   
             
  
 is then the complement of 
the expectation of separation for a  -subset for a given row. More specifically, this 
is the expectation that this  -subset is not separated in one row. By raising this 
value to the     power, this value represents the expectation that a  -subset is 
not separated in   independent trials, which correspond the rows in this scenario 
since each element is generated at random. Multiplying this total expectation for 
an arbitrary  -subset by the total number of  -subsets, ( 
 
), yields a bound on the 
expectation that no  -subset is separated. Since the number of separations is an 
integral value, if this expectation is less than 1, then it means that there exists 
some     array with   symbols that is a                . □ 
 
 
4.2 A Derandomized Construction of       
In order to derandomize the non-constructive      existence proof provided in 
Section 4.1, this technique is first formalized for the construction of     . This 
result is used to generalize to an algorithm that, when incorporated with the 
proper separation condition, will deterministically construct a wide variety of hash 
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families.  The separation conditions of       are then applied to this general 
algorithm, resulting in a deterministic construction algorithm for      . The 
technique used to derandomize the probabilistic construction in this work is the 
Method of Conditional Expectation [20]. This method removes the random choice 
in a probabilistic proof or algorithm by computing the conditional expectation of 
success for each possible value of this choice and deterministically selecting a 
value among these that meets or exceeds the expectation of success. This 
approach for efficiently and deterministically constructing combinatorial structures 
using a density-based algorithm was first put forth for pairwise testing [28] and 
Covering Arrays [29] and subsequently demonstrated for      [30]. Since       
generalize     , this  technique is a natural choice for constructing initial bounds 
on this type of family. 
In order to utilize the density-based algorithmic approach, it is first 
necessary to define the conditional expectation in terms of the choice being 
derandomized. For a    , the conditional expectation is the expected number of 
 -subsets newly separated by fixing an as-yet undetermined entry to a symbol 
  {     }. The formalization of this expected separation and subsequently, the 
conditional expected separation is as follows. 
 Let   be a  -subset of elements of a particular row   of a     consisting 
of fixed symbols and/or undetermined entries denoted by    . Without loss of 
generality, the  -subset can be arranged as follows: 
                          
where | |    and consists of   undetermined entries and     fixed entries. In 
order to compute the expected separation of this  -subset, first check for 
separation condition violations. In the case of a    , a separation condition 
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violation is simply a collision:               such that      . If a violation 
exists, the expected separation of this  -subset is necessarily 0 since no 
completion of this  -subset will prevent this violation. If there does not exist a 
collision in the populated elements, however, the computation of the expectation 
is as follows. 
For the   remaining entries to be filled, there are    ways to fully populate 
the undetermined entries. Since it is known that all    are unique, there are 
        ways to choose a valid symbol for   ,           ways to choose 
a valid symbol for   , and so on. Thus, the expectation that this subset be 
separated from all possible remaining completions of this subset is: 
 
         
∏                  
  
 
 
In fact, this is shown to be a generalization of the formula for the probability 
that a  -subset    consisting entirely of undetermined entries is separated. In this 
situation,     and the formula simplifies as follows: 
 
          
∏                  
  
 
∏            
  
  
 
Moreover, once this formula is obtained, the     analogue to the non-
constructive      existence proof can be expressed. By the same argument as 
the proof of Theorem 4.1.5, if, for any nonnegative integers      , the following 
inequality holds: 
  (
 
 
)              
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then there necessarily exists a             . A naïve attempt at forming a 
construction from this proof of existence is to create an array matching a set of 
parameters satisfying the above inequality and populate the entire array 
uniformly at random. At each stage, check to see if the structure produced is a 
    and if not, generate it again until the separation conditions are satisfied. 
This approach is a randomized algorithm in the Las Vegas style since any output 
necessarily satisfies all separation constraints, however, the algorithm is not 
guaranteed to terminate. 
Consider, for the purposes of derandomization, the Las Vegas style 
randomized algorithm used to construct instances of       whose existence are 
proven by the inequality in Theorem 4.1.5. Instead of generating an entire row or 
even an entire array at random, consider the selection of a single element. If, for 
the selection of every element in the array, the expected number of separations 
is at least as high as before fixing this symbol, then as the row is filled, this 
expectation becomes the actual number of separations. As mentioned 
previously, this technique was formalized for other combinatorial structures by 
Colbourn and Bryce [28] [30] and is now modified to construct      . 
  Let   be an     array initially populated entirely with  , denoting 
undetermined entries. Select the leftmost entry of the topmost row that is still a  . 
For all ways of fix this to a symbol   {     }, calculate the conditional 
expected separations of fixing this entry to  . Rather than selecting the optimal 
choice at every point, selecting one that is as good as average will suffice. Thus, 
the expected separation of the row after each selection is at least as high as it 
was previously and as each row is completed, the actual number of  -subset 
separations increases with the same rate as theorized by the inequality from 
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Theorem 4.1.5 upon iterating over      . When all   rows have been 
completed, the      has been constructed. The technique of reaching down and 
computing the expected separation for all possible choices for a given decision is 
precisely the desired approach for the Method of Conditional Expectation. 
Moreover, in this instance, it has been demonstrated to produce an efficient 
deterministic algorithm for actually constructing       from what started as a 
purely non-constructive existential proof. This algorithm is presented in full detail 
in Figure 4.2.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.1: Deterministic Construction of       in Polynomial Time 
Input:  𝑘: The number of columns for the 𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 
𝑣: The size of the set of symbols 
𝑡: The size of subsets needing to be separated 
  𝑤  The number of times a symbol can appear in a 𝑡-subset  
Output:  𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 𝑁 𝑘 𝑣 𝑤 𝑡  
 
procedure 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐𝐻𝐹 𝑘 𝑣 𝑤 𝑡 : 
begin 
 Initialize 𝐴 to empty array 
 Initialize 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 to (𝑘
𝑡
) 
 while 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠    
  Initialize 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 to expected separation of current row state 
  Add row {      𝑘} to bottom of 𝐴 
Initialize 𝑑 to 𝑡 
  while there remain any   in new row 
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≔ expected number of 𝑡-subsets separated by 
randomly completing the remainder of this row 
   Select index of leftmost   in row, call this  𝑖 
   for all 𝑣 ways to fix this symbol to  𝑠  {    𝑣} 
    for all (𝑘  
𝑡  
) subsets containing this index 
Compute each of these 𝑡-subset’s expectation 
of separation when setting  𝑖 to 𝑠 
Add to sum 𝛿𝑠 of all (
𝑘  
𝑡  
) expectations for 𝑠 
    if some 𝛿𝑠   𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 then 
     set  𝑖 to 𝑠 
Subtract number of newly separated 𝑡-subsets from 
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 return 𝐴 
end 
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Chapter 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1       Constructed by Derandomized Algorithm 
The algorithm presented in Figure 4.2.1 has been shown to deterministically 
construct       in polynomial time. Due to the unexplored nature of these hash 
families, this algorithm will be used to generate the first general results, giving a 
baseline for the overall bounds of the size of these arrays with respect to the 
parameters. An important caveat to the runtime of this algorithm is that, while it is 
polynomial in terms of the size parameters, it is exponential in terms of the 
strength  . For this reason, the constructions will be limited to instances of 
moderately small       strengths. For the purposes of the analysis, however, 
existential bounds will suffice, and as such, the examined data points can be 
extended to larger strengths.  
 Figure 5.2.1 demonstrates the most noticeable property of       when 
compared to     : they exist on very small numbers of rows. The relaxation of 
the separation condition is such that any element can separate a row in any of 
the (   
   
)  -subsets in which it is present even when multiple instances of that 
symbol already exist. Even for multiplicity caps as low as    , these families 
are extremely small. Using this simple construction method, for column sizes up 
to   1,000,000,000, no more than 1,000 rows are required to ensure     -
separation up to    , which is the highest calculable strength for which the 
expected separation calculation does not overflow a long integer in C/C++ during 
computation of       with the specified parameters. 
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Figure 5.1.1: Rows of a                 for                ,       
 
In consideration of the application-specific analysis to follow, the results of 
this initial analysis are extremely positive. The derandomized construction was 
able to produce       for all   100,000,000 and     in under 800 rows, which 
as Table 5.2.1 demonstrates, is surpassed by     size for       on similarly 
restrictive parameter choices. The row values corresponding to     were 
extrapolated from the existence proof due to infeasibility of runtime. Appendix A 
has the remaining tables of results for all    ; however, Table 5.1.2 represents 
the tightest constraints on      separation and as such are the largest instances 
produced.    
 The impact of the size of these data structures suggests that due to the 
relaxation of the separation property by increasing the multiplicity cap, naïve 
construction techniques actually yield results that are far closer to minimality. In 
support of this concept as described in the following section, techniques such as 
post-optimization will be significantly less likely to succeed in significantly 
reducing the size of the solutions generated. Furthermore, the    -specific 
implications of extremely small       is explored in detail in Section 5.3. 
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    3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
100 9 33 40 159 141 662 473 2610 1564 10043 
1000 14 53 65 265 239 1139 825 4618 2803 18245 
10000 19 72 90 370 335 1609 1172 6592 4021 26285 
100000 24 92 115 475 432 2079 1519 8564 5236 34309 
1000000 29 111 139 580 529 2549 1865 10536 6451 42332 
10000000 34 131 164 684 625 3019 2212 12507 7666 50355 
100000000 39 151 189 789 722 3488 2558 14478 8881 58377 
 
Table 5.1.2: Current best known       values for    ,          (
 
 
) 
 
 
5.2       Constructed by Post-Optimization 
Don’t-care post-optimization has been shown to be successful in measurably 
reducing the smallest known instances of    ,     , and other types of hash 
families [21]. By identifying elements of the hash family that are used in no 
unseparated  -subset, the algorithm slowly marks a row into don’t care positions 
until it can be determined that no element in the row is used in any separation, 
and as such can be entirely discarded. Due to the large number of rows for a 
    of sufficient size and strength, after identifying a primary row, each 
subsequent row is expected to separate progressively less and less subsets 
when scanning for separations from this point. While it is not guaranteed that a 
given row can be eliminated, this algorithm employs a randomized local-minima 
escape strategy when too many failed iterations have occurred. What’s more is 
that this algorithm can be stopped at any time and the output will still maintain its 
combinatoric properties, since the only modifications made are the removals of 
unnecessary elements. 
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A very notable property of       is that, even for small values of   which 
is the closest a      can get to being a     without actually being one, the 
structures are extremely small when compared to     . Since every      must 
have      , setting     and          (
  
 
) is placing the most constricting 
separation conditions possible on the family. Analyzing other choices of the 
parameters may produce different results; however, this choice was made to limit 
the scope of the potential variations to be studied to a set of restrictive 
conditions. Table 5.2.1 demonstrates the respective size of each structure under 
these conditions for      . In these instances, post-optimizing a single row 
would represent between a much larger overall reduction in size compared to a 
   . Were this to happen, it would be a massive improvement in design, 
however, the fact that rows must be removed in integral steps combined with the 
very low number of rows causes this technique to fail to identify candidate rows 
for removal much more often. 
 
T            
3 9 20 
4 33 71 
5 40 176 
6 159 1087 
 
Table 5.2.1:      (   ) and     Rows for       and Minimal   
 
 It is important to note that the       used for this comparison were not 
generated in an optimal fashion. These are all outputs of the derandomized 
construction method, which for other hash families, is demonstrably suboptimal. 
The small number of rows observed here becomes a crucial element in the 
performance of any post-optimization technique. 
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Due to the success with other forms of hashing, the don’t-care post-
optimization technique was applied to       in an attempt to improve upon the 
minimality of the constructed       produced by the derandomized algorithm. 
Despite the success of this algorithm elsewhere, the post-optimization of the 
      generated using the techniques proposed by this thesis did not 
significantly reduce row count in the constructed instances. Initial analysis of 
these results suggest that this due to a property that can informally be referred to 
as “row weight”. Specifically, this is the expected amount of separations that 
each row adds to the     . Massive instances of       exist on very few rows, 
and more importantly, despite the fact that many other separations have been 
made, the last row is still expected to cover a massive number of subsets.        
demonstrate a significantly higher row weight than     , which could attribute to 
the observed behavior. When performing the don’t-care post-optimization on 
these structures, the detection mechanism designed to avoid entering local 
minima triggered on every single execution. When disabling this feature of the 
algorithm, execution did not terminate after more than 36 hours of runtime on 
high multiplicity      . 
As an additional performance metric for this post-optimization technique, 
the percentage of elements within a candidate row that were identified as don’t-
care positions were tracked. As an example, for                    , the 
highest percentage of a row to be identified as don’t-care was approximately 
26%. Greater success was found for families of multiplicity    . These families 
are the closest in separation restriction to      and as such have the highest 
row counts. For       ,    , post-optimization reduced up to 12% of rows, 
but not in any predictably reliable fashion. Due to the intermittent results of this 
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approach, the      values analyzed for     purposes represent the instances 
generated in Section 5.1. While the lack of success of optimization was not the 
desired outcome, Section 5.3 describes how the initial near-minimality of       
created by even naïve techniques are actually competitive in their performance 
as constructions for       
 
 
5.3 Analysis of Key Material and Broadcast Overheads 
As previously described, for the purposes of analyzing the overheads associated 
with each scheme, all 1-resilient    s built utilize the same basic scheme. This 
decision, along with several other simplifying assumptions, was made to reduce 
the search space for constructing a    . Despite this simplification, however, the  
veracity of the comparison remains; the parameters limited are ones that could 
potentially represent a          as performing worse than its ideal possible 
performance. Using a    , the     parameters   and   are pre-defined by the 
    constraints, and   is a function of  ,  , and  . Thus, the only variable 
parameter to consider in terms of changing design overhead is  . 
For a         ,   and   are also pre-defined, but there is both the number 
of symbols   to consider as well as the initial     strength that is being 
constructed and deployed. Restricting the number of symbols to       such 
that  |  gives all      for a given  ,   that can be constructed from a uniform 
ingredient    . Non-uniform ingredients massively increase the search space, 
and by restricting the consideration to a subset of possible                
and then selecting the best instance will only overestimate the minimal 
construction, not underestimate it. For every  ,       , the analysis considers 
all  ,      . This yields all possible starting     strengths except for those 
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for which would be constructing a     (and thus be trivially equal to the     to 
which this scheme is being compared).  Finally, since the ingredient     is itself 
a    -based scheme, the equality:             is enforced. This is the most 
restrictive case for a    , and once again provides a pessimistic estimation that 
can only strengthen      claims made based on these results. If any       
    can be constructed more efficiently by using a pessimistic estimation for 
     overhead than by using a    ’s overhead, then the advantage over the 
previous scheme can still be claimed. In this analysis, efficiency is defined with 
respect to required number of broadcasts and average keys stored per user. 
In addition to the message component broadcasts required by each 
scheme, there is a separate broadcast overhead that has not been considered. 
This overhead is the cost of broadcasting to all users the composition of the 
privileged subset  . It can be assumed that as subscribers join the    , they are 
given a unique identifier, starting at 1 and increasing to  . Representing any 
subset   Ƥ    can be done in | | bits by transmitting a binary string in which a 
    represents a subscriber’s presence in the privileged subset and a     
represents his or her absence. Accordingly, all subscribers are able to identify   
yet only the privileged members can compute all portions of the key. 
The two broadcast overheads are distinguished from one another as the 
Set Identification Overhead (     and the Broadcast Encryption Overhead (   ), 
based on the function each overhead performs [1]. The Set Identification 
Overhead is absent from the compared overheads due to the fact that between 
schemes, the exact same identification must occur. 
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   3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
     
         
1 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 
     
         
- 1 5 5 8 8 8 11 12 14 15 16 17 
     
         
- - 1 3 6 8 11 13 16 21 26 32 35 
 
   16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
     
         
7 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 
     
         
19 20 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
     
         
39 44 49 53 57 61 64 68 71 74 78 82 85 
 
   29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
     
         
10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 
     
         
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 40 41 41 41 41 41 
     
         
88 90 94 97 100 104 104 108 110 114 116 119 121 
 
Table 5.3.1: Smallest known      of strength     
 
Instrumental in this analysis is a compilation of minimal instances of      
to use as ingredients for the final     [31]. Not only are minimality constraints 
better known for smaller constructions, but they will also provide for a more 
accurate analysis of the overheads of the     -based scheme. 
In order to efficiently compare the overheads associated with both the     
and the      scheme, the      values from Table 5.3.1 were written into a tool 
named Broadcast Encryption and Key Material Overhead (     ) that rapidly 
generates broadcast encryption instances when provided with the appropriate 
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hash families as input. The comparative results of this section are based on the 
output of      . 
An immediate finding in this comparison is the set of instances in which a 
                 out-performs a                in the construction of a 
         . Consider a     on 500 subscribers with a desired resilience of 6. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2: Broadcast and Key Material Overheads for                 
 
Figure 5.3.2 charts the various options for selecting a     for the Fiat-Naor 
Scheme. While there is no specific metric forcing this decision, selecting a     
close to the intersection of the two plots will give a moderate compromise 
between the two overheads. The output of the      used in this instance are the 
smallest known instances for their respective parameters. From this, an accurate 
comparison can be made. Table 5.3.3 gives the parameters associated with the 
best choice for each scheme built from instances generated by the 
derandomized construction. The solution in this situation is a trivial breakdown of 
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the scheme into various components. Due to utilizing a      on one row, it is not 
harnessing the inherent separation property across multiple      to great effect. 
 
 
Lowest Broadcast 
Overhead 
Lowest Keys per User 
   : B = 480, KpU ≈ 8000 B = 960, KpU ≈  6000 
    : B = 156, KpU ≈ 4316 B = 540, KpU ≈1494 
 
Table 5.3.3: Overhead Comparison for             
 
In general, the information rate of    -based broadcast encryption is well 
known. Stinson demonstrated that following the Fiat-Naor construction, the 
scheme produces an information rate: 
  
 
     
 
indicating that in order to compute the single key associated with the privileged 
subset for a given broadcast, a user must obtain     times as many keys. 
Similarly, due to the recursive nature of the         , the information rate for 
this scheme built from ingredient      is: 
  
      
 
 
             
 
   
 
 
           
 
when   is chosen minimally and so, it is clear that the information rate, and 
therefore the key material overhead for the          is dependent on the 
relationship between the size of the      solution and the size of its ingredients.  
If, for any size instance,                  holds, then the      
provides a higher information rate to the subscribers. Using       on schemes 
that were created by general methods that perform well asymptotically, a 
comparison between non-trivial instances of the schemes follows: 
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Semi-Optimized 
                
K N 
Info. 
Rate 
Broadcasts N 
Info. 
Rate 
Broadcasts 
10 142 1/1420 710 14 1/140 70 
20 247 1/4940 1235 57 1/1140 285 
30 304 1/9120 1520 90 1/2700 450 
40 343 1/13720 1715 119 1/4760 595 
 
                     
K N 
Info. 
Rate 
Broadcasts 
10 12 1/240 144 
20 21 1/1260 378 
30 26 1/3120 624 
40 29 1/4640 696 
 
Table 5.3.4: Comparison of            for     and      Based Schemes 
 
When operating on minimal instances of     , the performance of the 
   -based     out-performs the      scheme, however, the problem with this 
comparison is that the larger the hash families, the less is known about their 
minimality in general. The      in this method were generated using the same 
derandomized technique that produced the      . Once a certain threshold of 
strength and size is passed, this has been shown to be the best general 
construction for     . When comparing these schemes, it can be seen that 
      constructed by the same method offer a moderate key material savings. 
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Despite this fact, the broadcast overhead tends to be comparable between the 
schemes as the size increases up to a certain threshold.  As an additional factor 
of consideration, on very large      , partition sizes increase with 
 
 
 and the 
ingredient      will begin to suffer from the same drop-off as the original     
scheme. Should the      constructions improve as time goes on, these results 
will improve accordingly.  
 
Scheme Broadcast Encryption Overhead Key Material Overhead 
                          
      (         (
 
 
))  (          (
 
 
)) 
 
Table 5.3.5: Overheads for     and      Broadcast Encryption Schemes 
 
The comparison of both overheads between the two schemes is given in 
Table 5.3.5. The      scheme contains an additional logarithmic scaling, 
resulting from the overhead depending on both the      solution size as well as 
the ingredient     solution size. While these results provide the asymptotic 
behavior of each scheme, the empirical construction of the schemes 
demonstrates that the constant coefficient on size of the solutions is a non-trivial 
factor for small     instances. Moreover, should   be defined as a function of   
in both schemes, the additional scaling of the      scheme drops out entirely 
and they are equivalent asymptotically. 
Further analysis into the overhead suggests that there exists a break-even 
point for which     -based schemes with   independent of   begin to drop off 
due to their asymptotic behavior. As demonstrated in Section 5.1, easily 
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computable instances of       are significantly smaller than      on equal 
columns and strength, but since the      constructed from these       scale 
with an additional    (
 
 
) factor, there is some size     for which these schemes 
yield overheads greater than similarly generated    -based schemes. Creating 
schemes larger than this size favors other methods; however, should this point 
occur for     parameters far exceeding practical demands, then the     -based 
scheme offers a strict improvement. Determining this point requires a more in-
depth analysis than the big-O asymptotes provided by this work. The constant 
factors affecting      and       that are ignored by this analysis are necessary 
to ascertain the point of equivalence. 
 
  
60 
 
 
Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
By generalizing upon a well-known construction for broadcast encryption 
that inflates 1-resilient      into  -resiliency, this thesis has provided the 
fundamental rationale as well as the combinatorial basis for a new type of hash 
family. Scattering Hash Families generalize Perfect Hash Families and in order to 
analyze the properties of these families, techniques are formalized for their 
construction. Initial theoretic bounds have been given for these families as well, 
laying the foundation for more advanced approaches. 
In practice, a simple deterministic construction provided excellent results 
for the construction of      . The method used to create this construction draws 
from a derandomization approach that creates strong instances of other types of 
hash families, however, when applied to      , the results appear to produce far 
smaller solutions for computable instances. Due in part to this near-minimality, 
the level of performance of post-optimization in practice does not carry over from 
other known related combinatorial structures. 
While both the    -based     and the     -based     have closely 
bound overhead behaviors, the     -based scheme is able to exploit well-known 
minimal instances of      in situations in which the    -based     is relying on 
a non-minimal solution. This allows the newly defined scheme to provide 
comparable, and in some situations, better performance. In addition to the 
explicit benefit analysis of key material and broadcast overheads, the         
allows for an explicit, scalable design that can be efficiently constructed using 
simple deterministic methods.  
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 Due to their novel nature, there is great potential for future work in the area 
of Scattering Hash Families. More efficient constructions that can handle larger 
strengths may allow for a better understanding of these structures in general. 
Additionally, the only security parameter considered in the scope of this thesis is 
the resilience of the scheme being deployed. Combining this parameter with 
features such as traitor-tracing and frame-proofing would strengthen the 
schemes in practice; however, determining the combinatorial requirements to 
obtain these properties was beyond the scope of this work. Such expansion has 
ultimately led to a wide application of modern broadcast encryption techniques, 
and applying these techniques to this new scheme might provide insight into 
     schemes or variants thereof. 
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APPENDIX 
      FROM NON-CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF EXISTENCE 
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   ,               : 
    3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
100 9 33 40 159 141 662 473 2610 1564 10043 
1000 14 53 65 265 239 1139 825 4618 2803 18245 
10000 19 72 90 370 335 1609 1172 6592 4021 26285 
100000 24 92 115 475 432 2079 1519 8564 5236 34309 
1000000 29 111 139 580 529 2549 1865 10536 6451 42332 
10000000 34 131 164 684 625 3019 2212 12507 7666 50355 
100000000 39 151 189 789 722 3488 2558 14478 8881 58377 
 
 
   ,               : 
    3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
100 1 8 19 56 36 88 317 131 354 1553 
1000 1 12 31 94 61 151 553 231 634 2821 
10000 1 17 43 130 86 214 786 330 909 4064 
100000 1 21 54 167 111 276 1018 429 1184 5305 
1000000 1 26 66 204 135 338 1251 527 1458 6546 
10000000 1 30 78 241 160 401 1483 626 1733 7786 
100000000 1 34 90 278 185 463 1715 725 2007 9026 
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   ,               : 
    3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
100 1 1 7 14 30 82 34 66 150 514 
1000 1 1 11 23 51 140 60 116 269 933 
10000 1 1 15 33 71 198 85 165 386 1343 
100000 1 1 20 42 92 256 109 214 502 1753 
1000000 1 1 24 51 112 313 134 264 618 2163 
10000000 1 1 28 60 132 371 159 313 735 2573 
100000000 1 1 32 69 153 429 184 362 851 2983 
 
 
   ,               : 
    3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
100 1 1 1 7 12 21 42 108 
1000 1 1 1 11 20 36 73 191 
10000 1 1 1 15 27 51 104 273 
100000 1 1 1 19 35 66 135 355 
1000000 1 1 1 23 43 81 165 436 
10000000 1 1 1 27 51 96 196 518 
100000000 1 1 1 30 58 111 226 599 
 
